OpenSSL Security Advisory

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OpenSSL Security Advisory

openssl
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019]
============================================

0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559)
============================================

Severity: Moderate

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then
OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is
received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an
invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way
that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle
that could be used to decrypt data.

In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use.
Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used
ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a
protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do
anyway).

This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.

This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram,
with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. It was
reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.

Note
====

OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. Support
for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end on 11th
September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==========

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details
over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory

Scott Neugroschl-2
Is this a client-side or server-side vulnerability?  Or does it matter?

Thanks,

ScottN

---
Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation
4100 Guardian Street | Suite 100 |Simi Valley, CA 93063 | Phone 805 583-2874|Fax 805 583-0124 |




-----Original Message-----
From: openssl-users <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of OpenSSL
Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:59 AM
To: [hidden email]; OpenSSL User Support ML <[hidden email]>; OpenSSL Announce ML <[hidden email]>
Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019] ============================================

0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559) ============================================

Severity: Moderate

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.

In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use.
Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway).

This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.

OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.

This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.

Note
====

OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. Support for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end on 11th September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.

References
==========

URL for this Security Advisory:
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time.

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

Matt Caswell-2


On 27/02/2019 18:43, Scott Neugroschl wrote:
> Is this a client-side or server-side vulnerability?  Or does it matter?

It can apply to either side.

Matt


>
> Thanks,
>
> ScottN
>
> ---
> Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation
> 4100 Guardian Street | Suite 100 |Simi Valley, CA 93063 | Phone 805 583-2874|Fax 805 583-0124 |
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: openssl-users <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of OpenSSL
> Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:59 AM
> To: [hidden email]; OpenSSL User Support ML <[hidden email]>; OpenSSL Announce ML <[hidden email]>
> Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory
>
> OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019] ============================================
>
> 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559) ============================================
>
> Severity: Moderate
>
> If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
> SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
>
> In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use.
> Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway).
>
> This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.
>
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.
>
> This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
>
> Note
> ====
>
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. Support for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end on 11th September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
>
> References
> ==========
>
> URL for this Security Advisory:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt
>
> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time.
>
> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
>
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RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory

Scott Neugroschl-2
Thanks.

-----Original Message-----
From: openssl-users <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Matt Caswell
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2019 11:18 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory



On 27/02/2019 18:43, Scott Neugroschl wrote:
> Is this a client-side or server-side vulnerability?  Or does it matter?

It can apply to either side.

Matt


>
> Thanks,
>
> ScottN
>
> ---
> Scott Neugroschl | XYPRO Technology Corporation
> 4100 Guardian Street | Suite 100 |Simi Valley, CA 93063 | Phone 805 583-2874|Fax 805 583-0124 |
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: openssl-users <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of OpenSSL
> Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 6:59 AM
> To: [hidden email]; OpenSSL User Support ML <[hidden email]>; OpenSSL Announce ML <[hidden email]>
> Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory
>
> OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 February 2019] ============================================
>
> 0-byte record padding oracle (CVE-2019-1559) ============================================
>
> Severity: Moderate
>
> If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
> SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
>
> In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use.
> Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway).
>
> This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.
>
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2r.
>
> This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
>
> Note
> ====
>
> OpenSSL 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 are currently only receiving security updates. Support for 1.0.2 will end on 31st December 2019. Support for 1.1.0 will end on 11th September 2019. Users of these versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
>
> References
> ==========
>
> URL for this Security Advisory:
> https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt
>
> Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time.
>
> For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
> https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html
>