It seems subj is not present in OpenSSL as implementation or any helper
At the moment I have no deep understanding of both MSS and OpenSSL
design, but I'd like to know qualified opinions: is there a possibility
for adding MSS implementation to OpenSSL? If yes, I could work on
implementation if i get some menthorship, or i could donate for it.
On 1/6/2014 9:05 PM, Andrey Utkin wrote:
> Hi all.
> It seems subj is not present in OpenSSL as implementation or any helper
Hmm, I believe you are right, as I am not aware of any support for
limiting the number of invocation of a a private key, nor am I sure
the OpenSSL code is structured in a way suitable to the unusually
large key sizes needed.
> At the moment I have no deep understanding of both MSS and OpenSSL
> design, but I'd like to know qualified opinions: is there a possibility
> for adding MSS implementation to OpenSSL? If yes, I could work on
> implementation if i get some menthorship, or i could donate for it.
For a 256 bit security level (512 bit hashes), each one-time Lamport
private or public key will be 64 KB, and each Lamport signature 32KB.
To allow 2**n signatures per Merkle public key, the private key needs
to be 2**n * 64 KB (e.g. 64MB for 1024 signatures) and each Merkle
signature will be 32 KB + (n-1) * 64 bytes (e.g. 32.6 KB for 1024
signatures). The Merkle public key, however is just a single 64 byte
While it saves space, using a PRNG to replace the private key by an
RNG key that generates it is probably not a good idea if you worry about
the level of attacker skill implied by the need for Merkle
In practice, the infrastructure needed to handle Merkle signatures
with a practical usage count is going to be very similar to that
which is needed to implement one-time pads. Which means some kind
of tape-like storage with gradual self-destruct as each private key
is read and used. A modern 1TB backup tape could handle a private
key with 8 million uses, if supplemented by 1 GB of disk storage
for the public key hashes, however backup tape systems don't have
the gradual destruction mechanism, since they are designed for
backup survival, not destruction.
8 million uses corresponds to 8 million hits on a HTTPS server using
Merkle signatures with EDH or ECDH key exchange. And we still need
a usable quantum-resistant encryption and package mac scheme to make
this worthwhile. (Plus a quantum resistant key exchange that doesn't
require a private dark fiber between the parties).
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. http://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2730 Herlev, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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