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Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
I find that Firefox refuses to do any ephemeral ciphers whatsoever.  What the heck?  Why am I surprised.  Somebody paid them.

If you follow Schnieder, elliptic curve is not an option.

I know you guys are severely underfunded, but is there any chance that lattice encryption will be coming soon?  I've searched until my face turned blue.




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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
  • I find that Firefox refuses to do any ephemeral ciphers whatsoever.  What the heck?  Why am I surprised.  Somebody paid them.

 

I don’t know what server you are testing against, but FF does ECDHE all the time with no problems.

 

  • If you follow Schnieder, elliptic curve is not an option.

 

That’s interesting, you have a reference for that?

 

  • I know you guys are severely underfunded, but is there any chance that lattice encryption will be coming soon?  I've searched until my face turned blue.

 

We will most likely follow the IETF recommendation and see what the NIST post-quantum work comes up with.  That’s my personal opinion, not necessarily that of the whole time.


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Re: Lattice Ciphers

Kyle Hamilton
On Sun, Dec 17, 2017 at 3:58 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users
<[hidden email]> wrote:

>> If you follow Schnieder, elliptic curve is not an option.
>
> That’s interesting, you have a reference for that?

I'm guessing OP's referring to "Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition".
There was one page on elliptical curve cryptography, and it didn't
give any real information on what it was, what problem it uses (the
discrete logarithm problem), how it's used, or how DH is adapted to
use it.  The book was pretty much entirely against software patents,
and because ECC had been freshly patented it seemed to be much more
scary about the topic than it should have been.

-Kyle H
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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list

  • I find that Firefox refuses to do any ephemeral ciphers whatsoever.  What the heck?  Why am I surprised.  Somebody paid them. 

I don’t know what server you are testing against, but FF does ECDHE all the time with no problems.


I should have said, "I find that Firefox refuses to do any ephemeral ciphers whatsoever, which are not elliptic curve. (referring to DHE, EDH, et al)  What the heck?  Why am I surprised.  Somebody paid them.   Firefox insists on EC."


  • If you follow Schnieder, elliptic curve is not an option. 

That’s interesting, you have a reference for that?


Certainly.  Below.


  • I know you guys are severely underfunded, but is there any chance that lattice encryption will be coming soon?  I've searched until my face turned blue. 

We will most likely follow the IETF recommendation and see what the NIST post-quantum work comes up with.  That’s my personal opinion, not necessarily that of the whole time.


In August 2015, the NSA announced that it is planning to introduce a list of approved crypto methods that would resist quantum computers.  In April 2017, NIST naturally followed suit, starting a public vetting process which will last 4 to 6 years.  Needless to say, I am hoping that there will be lattice open-source alternatives which are not based on NIST algos.  I do enterprise infosec, and if the NSA can do it, KGB probably has similar methods, not to mention Russian, Israeli, & Chinese haqxors, the Norks, corporate operations, and so on.  Any crypto weakening, whether through flaw or Intent, is the wrong thing.

G**gle's Eric Schmidt says, "If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place.  This is a profoundly undemocratic attitude.  What would Thomas Paine, or Ben Franklin, or Patrick Henry say to this?

On Sun, Dec 17, 2017 at 3:58 PM, Salz, Rich via openssl-users

If you follow Schnieder, elliptic curve is not an option.
That’s interesting, you have a reference for that?

I'm guessing OP's referring to "Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition".
There was one page on elliptical curve cryptography, and it didn't
give any real information on what it was, what problem it uses (the
discrete logarithm problem), how it's used, or how DH is adapted to
use it. The book was pretty much entirely against software patents,
and because ECC had been freshly patented it seemed to be much more
scary about the topic than it should have been.

No:  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance ... and many more Schnier articles.  He puts out a monthly newsletter.

The NSA actually provided the elliptic curves for NIST's standards.  And the Snowden docs now show that those curves are related.

(Unfortunately Schnier's own website doesn't take his advice for some reason -- he's busy)



Also Apache is not actually enforcing server-ordering of ciphers BTW, but NginX does.

PS - does OpenSSL get funding from the DoD?

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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list

Okay, FF does ECDHE not DHE/EDH.  The whole industry does that, and most are using X25519 which was developed by Dan Bernstein.

 

The Guardian article you referenced didn’t even have the word curve in it.  My question – do you have a reference that shows Schneier says not to use elliptic curve – was not answered.

  • The NSA actually provided the elliptic curves for NIST's standards.  And the Snowden docs now show that those curves are related.

No they do not show that the curves are related.  And BTW, NIST just put 25519 and 448 into their recommended list.

  • PS - does OpenSSL get funding from the DoD?

Not that we know of, not at the present time.  Various branches did help fund FIPS work in the past.


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Re: Lattice Ciphers

Jeffrey Walton-3
In reply to this post by OpenSSL - User mailing list
On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 1:38 AM, Colony.three via openssl-users
<[hidden email]> wrote:
>
> G**gle's Eric Schmidt says, "If you have something that you don't want
> anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place.  This is
> a profoundly undemocratic attitude.  What would Thomas Paine, or Ben
> Franklin, or Patrick Henry say to this?

Off-topic, but... I was angry when I first read that, too.

Later I realized that was the best warning Google and Schmidt could
give. He basically told you government has infiltrated their systems,
and you should avoid their systems if security and privacy matters.

It is not just Google, but Google is the only one who has warned you.
Government has infiltrated other systems, including Apple, Amazon,
Microsoft, Saleforce, Rackspace and friends. You should be angry the
others have not warned you :)

Just avoid Google, Microsoft, Amazon and friends if your security and
privacy matters.

Jeff
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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
In reply to this post by OpenSSL - User mailing list

Okay, FF does ECDHE not DHE/EDH.  The whole industry does that, and most are using X25519 which was developed by Dan Bernstein.

FF claims it does DHE/EDH, but it does not actually, in practice.  It does either EC, or RSA.  I've tested it. (v52)  This does not look like an accident. 


 The Guardian article you referenced didn’t even have the word curve in it.  My question – do you have a reference that shows Schneier says not to use elliptic curve – was not answered.


You don't have to read the article if you don't want to.
"Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can."

  • The NSA actually provided the elliptic curves for NIST's standards.  And the Snowden docs now show that those curves are related.

No they do not show that the curves are related.  And BTW, NIST just put 25519 and 448 into their recommended list.


By its nature (secrecy), nothing public will prove the curves are related.  But Snowden documents show that they are.  And related curves have an inherent shortcut to cracking, which any well-funded haqxor or state-sponsored entity will have access to.



Later I realized that was the best warning Google and Schmidt could
give. He basically told you government has infiltrated their systems,
and you should avoid their systems if security and privacy matters.

What great PR, that it's become almost instinctive for people to ascribe benevolance to G**gle.  I believe that Schmidt was telling us his true position though.

The one I am angry with is Mozilla, for not giving us a choice.  Chrome is a choice?!  Safari is a choice?!  IE is a choice?!  No.  They are not.



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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
In reply to this post by OpenSSL - User mailing list

  • FF claims it does DHE/EDH, but it does not actually, in practice.  It does either EC, or RSA.  I've tested it. (v52)  This does not look like an accident. 

 Have you find a server that does DHE/EDH, and only that, that FF cannot connect to?


I've set mine to test this comprehensively. (Apache and NginX)  With Apache Firefox -ignores- server-prescribed ciphers and chooses an EC.  NginX does properly prevail with the algo.  Was this an accident, Apache?

And Firefox simply can not make a connexion when the only choices are the DHE/EDH algos -- which they say they can do here.


  • "Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can.

I missed that, thanks.  And for non-NSA curves that aren’t influenced?


As with Schnier, I don't trust any EC.  It's a shame.  I am looking forward to independent lattice. (Not that Mozilla, will implement it)  For now I'm set to DHE/EDH (fruitlessly) and RSA (AES).  RSA is cracked by a very few, but this is the decision I've made.


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Re: Lattice Ciphers

Alan Buxey-2
Have you submitted a bug report for Apache (not honouring server config cipher order) if one doesn't exist?

As for resistant to quantum computers, given the current aim is for systems that can calculate things that would currently take the age of the universe to calculate, resistance is futile ;)

alan

On 18 Dec 2017 4:47 pm, "Colony.three via openssl-users" <[hidden email]> wrote:

  • FF claims it does DHE/EDH, but it does not actually, in practice.  It does either EC, or RSA.  I've tested it. (v52)  This does not look like an accident. 

 Have you find a server that does DHE/EDH, and only that, that FF cannot connect to?


I've set mine to test this comprehensively. (Apache and NginX)  With Apache Firefox -ignores- server-prescribed ciphers and chooses an EC.  NginX does properly prevail with the algo.  Was this an accident, Apache?

And Firefox simply can not make a connexion when the only choices are the DHE/EDH algos -- which they say they can do here.


  • "Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can.

I missed that, thanks.  And for non-NSA curves that aren’t influenced?


As with Schnier, I don't trust any EC.  It's a shame.  I am looking forward to independent lattice. (Not that Mozilla, will implement it)  For now I'm set to DHE/EDH (fruitlessly) and RSA (AES).  RSA is cracked by a very few, but this is the decision I've made.


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Re: Lattice Ciphers

Michael Ströder
In reply to this post by OpenSSL - User mailing list
Colony.three via openssl-users wrote:
> I've set mine to test this comprehensively. (Apache and NginX)  With
> Apache Firefox -ignores- server-prescribed ciphers and chooses an EC. 
> NginX does properly prevail with the algo.  Was this an accident, Apache?

I'd suggest to read the Apache httpd docs first:

https://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_ssl.html#sslhonorcipherorder

Ciao, Michael.


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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
In reply to this post by Alan Buxey-2

Have you submitted a bug report for Apache (not honouring server config cipher order) if one doesn't exist?

That never works.


As for resistant to quantum computers, given the current aim is for systems that can calculate things that would currently take the age of the universe to calculate, resistance is futile ;)

I never allow the perfect, to become the enemy of the good.

I am looking forward to lattice.





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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
In reply to this post by Michael Ströder

Colony.three via openssl-users wrote:
I've set mine to test this comprehensively. (Apache and NginX)  With
Apache Firefox -ignores- server-prescribed ciphers and chooses an EC. 
NginX does properly prevail with the algo.  Was this an accident, Apache?

I'd suggest to read the Apache httpd docs first:



So you think I didn't use this.

For those who are aware, I implied this by intentionally using the word 'insist' WRT NginX.  I could have overtly said what proper options I'd used for every case in every instance, but I was hoping  ppl here would see.

This is why I believe this is not an accident.

Hear about the HP keylogging case recently?  Do you think a keylogger is actually used in testing of a keyboard driver, in practice?

How about you actually try  SSLHonorCipherOrder on in Apache, Michael, and try the different cipher combinations?  Let us know how it works out.




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Re: Lattice Ciphers

Kyle Hamilton
On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Colony.three via openssl-users
<[hidden email]> wrote:
>
> Hear about the HP keylogging case recently?  Do you think a keylogger is
> actually used in testing of a keyboard driver, in practice?

Yes.

More specifically, it's used to ensure that the scancodes that should
be detected when a particular key is hit or released are actually
detected when that key is hit or released.  It's also useful for
identifying how a particular keyboard has failed, to see which
scancodes aren't being transmitted properly.

That said, it's not something that should be left in a production
driver.  It's more suited for a development/diagnostics station than a
general-purpose system.

(Eeesh.  And my friends call *me* "paranoid".)

-Kyle H
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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Colony.three via openssl-users
Hear about the HP keylogging case recently? Do you think a keylogger is
actually used in testing of a keyboard driver, in practice?

Yes.

More specifically, it's used to ensure that the scancodes that should
be detected when a particular key is hit or released are actually
detected when that key is hit or released. It's also useful for
identifying how a particular keyboard has failed, to see which
scancodes aren't being transmitted properly.

That said, it's not something that should be left in a production
driver. It's more suited for a development/diagnostics station than a
general-purpose system.

Actually no.  Microseconds count, when testing a keyboard driver.  It's easy to imagine that a keylogger could be used, that's why the cover story worked on so many.  But in actual practice it's not useful.


(Eeesh. And my friends call me "paranoid".)


It's easy to characterize this as paranoia.  Unless you are paying attention to -facts- as the feedstock.



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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Colony.three via openssl-users
Hear about the HP keylogging case recently? Do you think a keylogger is
actually used in testing of a keyboard driver, in practice?

Yes.

More specifically, it's used to ensure that the scancodes that should
be detected when a particular key is hit or released are actually
detected when that key is hit or released. It's also useful for
identifying how a particular keyboard has failed, to see which
scancodes aren't being transmitted properly.

That said, it's not something that should be left in a production
driver. It's more suited for a development/diagnostics station than a
general-purpose system.

Actually no.  Microseconds count, when testing a keyboard driver.  It's easy to imagine that a keylogger could be used, that's why the cover story worked on so many.  But in actual practice it's not useful.


(Eeesh. And my friends call me "paranoid".)


It's easy to characterize this as paranoia.  Unless you are paying attention to -facts- as the feedstock.

I should have said, "It's easy --and fun-- to characterize this as paranoia."

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Re: Lattice Ciphers

Jakob Bohm-7
In reply to this post by OpenSSL - User mailing list
On 18/12/2017 20:50, Colony.three via openssl-users wrote:

>
>> On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Colony.three via openssl-users
>> [hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>wrote:
>>
>>     Hear about the HP keylogging case recently? Do you think a
>>     keylogger is
>>     actually used in testing of a keyboard driver, in practice?
>>
>>     Yes.
>>
>>     More specifically, it's used to ensure that the scancodes that should
>>     be detected when a particular key is hit or released are actually
>>     detected when that key is hit or released. It's also useful for
>>     identifying how a particular keyboard has failed, to see which
>>     scancodes aren't being transmitted properly.
>>
>>     That said, it's not something that should be left in a production
>>     driver. It's more suited for a development/diagnostics station than a
>>     general-purpose system.
>>
>
> Actually no.  Microseconds count, when testing a keyboard driver. 
> It's easy to imagine that a keylogger could be used, that's why the
> cover story worked on so many.  But in actual practice it's not useful.
>
>
>>     (Eeesh. And my friends call /me/"paranoid".)
>>
>
> It's easy to characterize this as paranoia.  Unless you are paying
> attention to -facts- as the feedstock.
>
For your information, I actually tracked down the original report
about this (and posted some corrections in a comment to the
researcher):

1. This was not HP's keyboard driver.  This was Synaptics' touch
   pad driver (SynTP.sys).

2. The code in question was apparently the common classic issue
   that the driver checks if a hotkey related to the touchpad is
   pressed, and has a test feature to help each laptop manufacturer
   check if they configured the correct (laptop-specific) scan code
   for that hotkey by using a special test driver that logs the keys
   that match/don't match the configured one.  On a number of
   occasions HP (and maybe others) have sent such test drivers to end
   users instead of the drivers without the debug feature.

3. In this case, no keys were logged unless someone (or something)
   with admin rights on the laptop did extra steps to turn on the
   feature and to read back the results.  Any malicious code with
   those rights could just install its own logging without depending
   on that particular wrong driver being installed.

So to me, that particular issue falls into the less serious tier of:
Possible misuse if other things go wrong first, upgrade when ready as
a defense in depth.

Enjoy

Jakob
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Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
.
For your information, I actually tracked down the original report
about this (and posted some corrections in a comment to the
researcher):
  1. This was not HP's keyboard driver.  This was Synaptics' touch
      pad driver (SynTP.sys).

Never said it is HP's driver.  But understand, that it only went in to HP machines. 

As far as we know.  That, I have said.


  1. The code in question was apparently the common classic issue
      that the driver checks if a hotkey related to the touchpad is
      pressed, and has a test feature to help each laptop manufacturer
      check if they configured the correct (laptop-specific) scan code
      for that hotkey by using a special test driver that logs the keys
      that match/don't match the configured one.  On a number of
      occasions HP (and maybe others) have sent such test drivers to end
      users instead of the drivers without the debug feature.

A keylogger is not useful in this case, particularly as timing is an acute issue.  At the most basic, when they want what you portray, a utility like evtest.

  1. In this case, no keys were logged unless someone (or something)
      with admin rights on the laptop did extra steps to turn on the
      feature and to read back the results.  Any malicious code with
      those rights could just install its own logging without depending
      on that particular wrong driver being installed,
  2. So to me, that particular issue falls into the less serious tier of:
    Possible misuse if other things go wrong first, upgrade when ready as
    a defense in depth.
  3. Jakob
Correct, it is not turned on by default.  Never said otherwise.  But it can be manually.

So far I've raised three independent issues in this thread, and have been fought on all three.  I am bored now with trying to raise awareness, so let's just all agree that nobody wants to hear it.  You do your thing and I'll do mine.




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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
PS, Jakob I'm getting on your email:  "This email has failed its domain's authentication requirements. It may be spoofed or improperly forwarded!"

The reason is:  HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,T_DKIM_INVALID





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Re: Lattice Ciphers

Jakob Bohm-7
On 18/12/2017 22:35, Colony.three via openssl-users wrote:
> PS, Jakob I'm getting on your email:  "This email has failed its
> domain's authentication requirements. It may be spoofed or improperly
> forwarded!"
>
> The reason is: HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,T_DKIM_INVALID
>
Can you send me the full headers, so I can debug?

Enjoy

Jakob
--
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Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

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Re: Lattice Ciphers

OpenSSL - User mailing list
On 18/12/2017 22:35, Colony.three via openssl-users wrote:
PS, Jakob I'm getting on your email:  "This email has failed its
domain's authentication requirements. It may be spoofed or improperly
forwarded!"
The reason is: HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,T_DKIM_INVALID

Can you send me the full headers, so I can debug?

Enjoy

Jakob





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Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 23:35:55 +0100
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Subject: Re: [openssl-users] Lattice Ciphers
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